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Abstract
This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to ex-
penditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer
payment is then determined by the government’s budget constraint.
The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person
is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the mean wage,
and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate dis-
tribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative
to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, in-
creases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with
increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond
a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower
ratio of transfers to public goods.
∗We are grateful to Shuyun May Li for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
11 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine the optimal composition of government
expenditure, that is, the composition that maximises a social welfare func-
tion which is considered to be a function of individuals’ (indirect) utilities.
In particular the division between expenditure on public goods and on trans-
fer payments is examined. A simple static model is constructed in which
individuals have similar preferences, but diﬀering abilities and thus wages,
and expenditure is ﬁnanced by a proportional income tax.1 The analysis,
while being in the tradition of optimal tax models, therefore diﬀers from
the standard problem in the optimal tax literature, which is concerned with
the determination of the tax level and its associated transfer payment.2 The
present paper considers the optimal allocation between the two categories for
a given tax rate, and thus the way in which the allocation varies as the tax
rate varies. The tax rate may be regarded as being determined by other con-
siderations, for example relating to taxable capacity or ‘conventional’ or po-
litically acceptable levels. Unlike the standard optimal tax framework where
closed-form solutions are seldom available, explicit expressions for transfer
and public good expenditure are derived. Comparisons are made with the
case where the composition of expenditure is determined by majority voting.
The basic model and framework of analysis are described in Section 2,
which derives the indirect utility function of each individual, expressed in
terms of expenditure on the public good, the transfer payment and the given
tax rate. Section 3 derives the optimal allocation of expenditure for an
exogenous tax rate. The solutions are shown to depend on the ratio of
1This focus contrasts with the large literature concerned with the optimal allocation
between consumption and investment expenditure in a growth framework. In such models,
a social planner, or representative agent, chooses the optimal composition of government
expenditure to maximise a multi-period welfare function: for recent examples see, for
example, Chen (2006), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2006), Piras (2001) and Lee (1992).
2With three policy instruments and a government budget constraint, there are two
degrees of freedom. It would be possible to use numerical methods to carry out a two-
dimensional search — over the public good expenditure and the tax rate — to obtain the
values which maximise a speciﬁed social welfare function. But the focus here is on the
expenditure composition where explicit solutions are derived, giving insights into the de-
terminants.
2a measure of location of the wage rate distribution to the arithmetic mean
wage. The location measure is a weighted average of wage rates, with weights
depending on the properties of the social welfare function being maximised.
In this section a comparison with the median voter outcome is also made.
Since each model involves the use of a wage ratio, comparisons between the
relevant ratios are made in Section 4. Section 5 reports numerical examples
to investigate the relationship between the two approaches, and between the
composition of expenditure and the tax rate, as well as examining the eﬀect of
changes in the wage rate distribution. In particular the relationship between
the composition of expenditure and the ratio of the median to the average
wage rate, and the income tax rate, are investigated. Brief conclusions are
in Section 7.
2 Individual Preferences
This section derives individuals’ indirect utility functions. The direct utility
function and optimal consumption and labour supply, for an individual who
faces a given wage rate and tax rate and receives a non means-tested transfer
payment, or basic income, are examined in subsection 2.1. Subsection 2.2
gives the indirect utility function in terms of public good expenditure, the
t r a n s f e rp a y m e n ta n dt h et a xr a t e .E a r n i n g sa r et h eo n l ys o u r c eo fi n c o m e
and tax revenue is devoted only to the provision of the pure public good and
the transfer payment.
2.1 Individual Consumption and Labour Supply
Each individual is assumed to derive utility from consumption, c,l e i s u r e ,
h, and the public good, G.B y d e ﬁnition all individuals consume the same
amount of the pure public good which must be tax-ﬁnanced. Individuals have
similar preferences but diﬀerent productivities and therefore wage rates, w.






3Although all individuals consume the same amount of the public good, they
do not receive the same beneﬁts: higher wage individuals experience higher
marginal utility.
T h ec h o i c eo fG is not determined at the individual level, since individuals
cannot be excluded. The price of the consumption good is normalised to
unity, so that consumption and net earnings are equal. Suppose there is an
unconditional and untaxed transfer payment of b per individual. There is a
simple proportional income tax, with the rate, t, so that the price of leisure
is w(1 − t). Therefore the form of individual’s budget constraint is:
c = w(1 − h)(1 − t)+b (2)
The transfer payment per person is restricted to be positive, so that, for
example, public goods expenditure cannot be ﬁnanced from a poll tax.
Deﬁnd full income, M, as the net income obtained if all the individual’s
endowment of one unit of time is devoted to work, so that M = w(1−t)+b
and the budget constraint can is:
c + hw(1 − t)=M (3)
Using the standard properties of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the de-



















Where h<1, that is the individual works, if the wage rate exceeds a thresh-






The indirect utility function, V , is obtained by substituting the solutions for



























The indirect utilities provide the arguments of the social welfare function,
examined in the following section.
3 The Optimal Composition of Expenditure
This section examines the optimal composition of expenditure where social
welfare, W,i sd e ﬁned in terms of individuals’ indirect utilities. The associ-
ated social indiﬀerence curves, showing combinations of G and b which leave
W unchanged, are derived in subsection 3.1. An optimal allocation of ex-
penditure is obtained as a point of tangency of the highest social indiﬀerence
curve which can be reached subject to the government’s budget constraint
relating G and b. This constraint is derived in subsection 3.2. The optimal
p o l i c yi st h u sg i v e nf r o mt h ec o n d i t i o n :
db
dG





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
W
(9)
Closed-form solutions are obtained in subsection 3.3. Finally, in subsection
(3.4) a comparison with the majority voting outcome is made.
3.1 Social Indiﬀerence Curves
The social evaluation, or social welfare, function of the planner is considered
to be a general function of indirect utilities, so that:
W = W (V1,...Vn) (10)





















5Consider social indiﬀerence curves relating combinations of G and b for which



























This slope can be expressed more conveniently by deﬁning vi as the welfare


































Substituting (13) and (14) into (12) gives:
db
dG




























i=1 vi.T h e s l o p e o f s o c i a l i n d i ﬀerence curves is therefore
a weighted sum of the ratio of ∂Vi/∂G to ∂Vi/∂b.D i ﬀerentiating (6) with
respect to G and b gives :
∂Vi
∂G

































6The slope of social indiﬀerence curves is therefore:
db
dG































This is the right hand side of the tangency condition in (9). The left hand
side is derived in the following subsection.
3.2 The Government Budget Constraint
The government budget constraint requires that total revenue from the pro-
portional income tax, equal to t
Pn
i=1 yi for a population of n individuals,






where y denotes arithmetic mean earnings. The analysis is simpliﬁed by
the assumption that wi >w min for all individuals, implying that everyone




and average income, since individuals have similar preferences, is:






where w denotes the arithmetic mean wage rate. By substituting (22) in














1−t,a v e r -




H (wmin) where H (wmin)={1 − F1 (wmin)} −
θ
(1−β0)w {1 − F (wmin)} and θ = bβ
0/(1 − t),a n dF1 (wmin) and F (wmin) denote respec-
tively the proportion of total wage (rates) and the proportion of people with w<w min.
On functions of the form H (.), see Creedy (1996).














This provides the left hand side of the condition in (9).
3.3 The Tangency Solution
Substituting (20) and (24) into (9), and deﬁning ˜ w =
Pn
i v0
iwi as a weighted








(1 − α − β)
(α + β)G
((1 − t)˜ w + b) (25)
Finally, substituting for b using (23), it is found that the optimal public
expenditure per person, GW/n, can be expressed as:
GW
n
=( 1− α − β){˜ w + t(1 − β
0)(w − ˜ w)} (26)
T h er e s u l t i n gv a l u eo fbW is given by appropriate substitution into (23).
These values apply for positive values of the social transfer, so the given













1 − (α + β)
¶¸−1
(27)
The focus here is on the ratio of the transfer payment to the expenditure
on the public good per person, rather than absolute values. It can be shown
that this ratio, RW = bW/(GW/n),i sg i v e nb y :
RW =
1 − t



















This result shows that the ratio of the transfer payment to public goods
expenditure per person depends, among other things, on the ratio of the
welfare-weighted wage rate to the average wage rate.
4In addition, the tax rate is also subject to an upper limit, given the assumption that
all individuals work, so that for sensible values the social transfer must remain suﬃciently
below the minimum wage.
8The expression in (28) is highly nonlinear in ˜ w/¯ w and t. However, the
relationship between increasing ˜ w








t(1 − t)(1 − β
0)(1 − t(1 − β
0))
(1 − α − β)
©
˜ w
w(1 − t(1 − β
0)) + t(1 − β
0)
ª2 < 0 (29)
Higher inequality aversion reduces ˜ w relative to ¯ w, and (29) demonstrates
that this leads to a higher ratio of expenditure on transfer payment to public
goods. Hence, both higher wage inequality and inequality aversion lead to a
more redistributive expenditure policy.
Furthermore, it can be shown that
∂2RW
∂t2 < 0 (30)
so that there is a concave relationship between RW and t.T h eﬁrst derivative
∂RW/∂t is positive for low values of t and negative for relatively higher
values. This is dominated by the concave relationship between bW and t,
since ∂GW/∂t is positive, while ∂2GW/∂t2 =0for all relevant values of t.
Hence GW increases linearly with t.
The concavity of RW with respect to t is therefore strongly aﬀected by
the labour supply eﬀects of taxes and transfers. Hence initial increases in the
tax rate from a relatively low level are used to increase income redistribution
by increasing the proportion of expenditure devoted to transfer payments.
But beyond a certain level, further increase in t have the eﬀect of reducing
the optimal proportion spent on transfers.
The partial derivatives ∂ (GW/n)/∂ (¯ w) and ∂ (bW)/∂ (¯ w) are both posi-
tive so that an upward shift in the distribution of wage rates unambiguously
increases the optimum expenditure on the public goods and transfer payment.
The partial derivatives ∂ (GW/n)/∂ (˜ w) and ∂ (bW)/∂ (˜ w) are positive and
negative respectively. Hence a increase in ˜ w (with an unchanged arithmetic
mean wage) has a positive eﬀect on public goods and total expenditure, but
reduces the absolute social transfer and the ratio of the transfer to public
good expenditure.
93.4 Comparison with Majority Voting
The previous section obtained an expression for the optimal expenditure on
public goods, GW, in terms of a welfare-weighted average wage rate, ˜ w.I n
an earlier paper, Creedy and Moslehi (2007), considered the majority choice
of the composition of expenditure within the same basic framework.5 The
conditions required for the median voter theory to hold were found to be
satisﬁed and the median voter is unambiguously identiﬁed as the individual
with median wage, wm. The resulting expenditure on the public good, Gm,
was found to be:
Gm
n
=( 1− α − β){wm + t(1 − β
0)(¯ w − wm)} (31)
and of course the transfer payment, bm is obtained from the government bud-
g e tc o n s t r a i n ti n( 2 3 ) .H e n c et h eo n l yd i ﬀerence between the two approaches
concerns the wage ratio used. In the median voter model, the relevant vari-
able is wm/¯ w whereas social welfare maximisation involves ˜ w/¯ w,t h er a t i o
of the welfare-weighted average wage to the arithmetic mean wage. The
following subsection therefore examines these two ratios in further detail.
4 Alternative Wage Ratios
T oe x a m i n eh o wt h et w or e l e v a n tw a g er a t i o s ,wm/¯ w and ˜ w/¯ w,d i ﬀer, it is
useful to assume a speciﬁc functional form for the wage rate distribution.
Suppose that wages follow a lognormal distribution with mean and variance
of logarithms of μ and σ2 respectively. Hence the median and mean wage














5This framework again diﬀers from the majority voting models concerned with the
choice of government size (the tax rate used to ﬁnance a transfer payment). Those models,
like optimal tax models, rarely provide explicit or closed-form solutions. On such models
see, for example, Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard (1981), Tabellini and Alesina (1990),
Tridimas and Winer (2005) and Borck (2007).
10This expression shows that wm/wm depends only on the variance of loga-
rithms of wages. Decreasing the ratio of median to mean wage rates implies
an increase in the skewness of the distribution and in this positively skewed
case it also reﬂects an increasing in inequality, as measured by σ2.




∂b , and hence the weight v0
i, is highly complex even for simple forms
of W. For example, suppose the social planner maximizes an additive social








i ε 6=1 ,ε>0 (33)
=l o g yε =1
where ε is the degree of concavity of the weighting function and represents
the degree of constant relative inequality aversion of the planner. Hence
∂W/∂Vi = V
−ε
i and substituing for V from (8), with (7), along with ∂Vi/∂b
from (18) gives a very awkward expression for ∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂b , making comparisons
with the median voter model diﬃcult.
Suppose instead that the welfare weights can be treated as depending
directly on wage rates.6 The weighted average ˜ w can be regarded as ap-
proximated by an ‘equally distributed equivalent’ value, we:t h i si st h ew a g e
which, if obtained by everyone, gives the same welfare, deﬁned in terms of the
wis, as the actual distribution. This concept is associated with the Atkinson
measure of inequality, A, which is expressed as the proportional diﬀerence
between the arithmetic mean wage and the equally distributed equivalent
wage level, so that:
A =
























6This kind of assumption is commonly made. For example, in the marginal indirect tax















The expression in (36) can be further simpliﬁed using the properties of
the lognormal distribution where, as above, w is distributed as Λ(μ,σ2).
Since logw1−ε =( 1− ε)logw,t h et e r mw1−ε is lognormally distributed as
Λ((1 − ε)μ,(1 − ε)
2 σ2). U s i n gt h er e s u l tf o rt h ea r i t h m e t i cm e a no fal o g -
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Consequently, the ratio of the equally distributed equivalent wage to the





























Comparing equations (32) and (39) shows that the relationship between the








Thus, if ˜ w is approximated by we, (40) gives the required relationship
between the two wage ratios. This result shows that, when ε =1the optimal
choice is identical to that of the median voter. However, it is not appropriate
to suggest that the median voter has inequality aversion of 1. Indeed, the
majority voting outcome arises from entirely selﬁsh behaviour where the
utility of other individuals is not taken into account at all.7
7However, Creedy and Moslehi (2007) show how the majority voting outcome is mod-
iﬁed in cases where voters do have an aversion to inequality.
12Substitution of ˜ w =( wm/¯ w)
ε into (28), gives the ratio of expenditure on






















The ﬁrst derivative of equation (41) with respect to ε gives the relationship
between inequality aversion of the social planner and the ratio of the transfer






















is negative and the relationship between
RW and inequality aversion is positive. This result conﬁrms that higher
inequality aversion leads to a larger proportion of expenditure devoted to
the transfer payment.
5 Some Numerical Examples
This section provides numerical examples of the sensitivity of optimal out-
comes to variations in selected parameters of the model, in particular the
degree of relative inequality aversion, ε,t h et a xr a t e ,t,a n dt h er a t i oo ft h e
welfare-weighted average wage to the arithmetic mean wage, ˜ w/¯ w.
The examples are obtained using preference parameters of α =0 .58 and
β =0 .4. These produce, with a tax rate of t =0 .25, a sensible proportion
of time devoted to labour supply. When reporting absolute values of b and
G/n, the arithmetic mean and median wage rates used, expressed in annual
terms, are $70000 and $60000 respectively.8 Using (40), ˜ w/¯ w is obtained as
(wm/¯ w)ε for diﬀerent ε.
8These are consistent with a lognormal distribution with mean and standard deviation
of logarithms of hourly wage rates of 2.87 and 0.56: these are similar to those for Australia.
Using the properties of the lognormal distribution the arithmetic mean and the median
hourly wage rate are 20.64 = exp(2.87+0.56/2) and 17.64 = exp(2.87):s e eA i t c h i s o na n d
Brown (1957). Furthermore, the maximum hours per day are set at 13 to obtain annual
equivalents.
13Figure 1: Variation in bW/(GW/n) with wm/¯ w for Diﬀrent ε
Figure1 shows the relationship between bW/(GW/n) and wm/¯ w for the
diﬀerent value of ε and benchmark preference parameters, with t =0 .25.I t
illustrates the property mentione above that the social planner’s choice of
bW/(GW/n) falls as inequality falls, that is as wm/¯ w increases towards unity.
When ε is less than one, the optimal proportion of expenditure devoted
to redistributive transfer payments is substantially less than the majority
voting outcome, and is less sensitive to variations in the ratio wm/¯ w.W h e r e
the social welfare function has a high degree of inequality aversion, Figure 1
shows that the response of the expenditure pattern to changes in wage rate
inequality is very diﬀerent from that of the median voter. Increasing values
of wm/¯ w, when there is substantial inequality, has little eﬀect on the ratio
bW/(GW/n). But around the range where the median is half the arithmetic
mean, further increases in wm/¯ w (that is, reductions in inequality) have a
considerably eﬀect on the optimal choice of redistributive transfers relative to
public good expenditure. The relationship between bW/(GW/n) and wm/¯ w
is sigmoid for high ε, whereas that for the median voter is closer to being
14Figure 2: The Optimal Composition and Variations in the Tax Rate
15quadratic.
Figure 2 shows the variation in diﬀerent types of government expenditure
as the tax rate (considered here to be exogenous) increases. As shown in
the individual ﬁgures there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
absolute level of the transfer payment and the tax rate, and between the ratio
bW/(GW/n) and the tax rate. Nevertheless, expenditure on public goods is
linearly related to the tax rate: this was established analytically above, where
it was shown that ∂GW/∂t is positive and ∂2GW/∂t2 =0 . The shapes of
the various proﬁles are very similar for diﬀerent ε values. As expected higher
inequality aversion is consistently associated with higher optimal expenditure
on the transfer payment and lower expenditure on the public good. Care is
needed in comparing the ﬁrst two parts of the ﬁgure, in view of the fact that
the scales on the vertical axes are substantially diﬀerent.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between bW/(GW/n) and ε for diﬀerent
ratios of median to mean wage rate. As expected from the analytical result,
raising inequality aversion reduces the optimal ratio of expenditure on the
transfer payment to public goods. From the analytical result given above,
R does not necessarily increase at an increasing rate as inequality aversion
increases, although it does so for the range of values shown in Figure 3. For
the lower values of wm/¯ w, the proﬁl e sw e r ef o u n dt ob ec o n c a v eo v e rh i g h e r
ranges of ε, but such high values of inequality aversion are not relevant.9
6E m p i r i c a l S p e c i ﬁcations
Since the relationship between Rm and wm/¯ w is exactly the same as the re-
lationship between RW and ˜ w/¯ w, the question arises of whether it is possible
to distinguish empirically between the two models. Hence, if the composition
of expenditure were actually determined by a process that corresponds to the
maximisation of a welfare function, is it likely that estimates of the relevant
relationship would mistakenly support the median voter model?
Despite the complexity of the relationship in (28) it can be shown that
9Beyond the maximum value of ε s h o w ni nt h eﬁgure, aversion is close to becoming
‘extreme’, thereby corresponding to the ‘maxi-min’ case.
16Figure 3: Variation in bW/(GW/n) with ε for Diﬀrent wm/¯ w
Rm can be approximated by a linear relationship involving wm/¯ w and its
square, and t and its square. Hence any attempt to test the median voter
model involves estimation of the regression equation:








+ α3t + α4t
2 (43)
If the resulting values of α1 and α2 are such that R continues to decline as
wm/¯ w increases towards 1, and if the values of α3 and α4 are such that R
reaches a maximum with respect to t at a sensible value of t, the estimates
would seem to provide support for the median voter model.
However, if policy is more appropriately modelled ‘as if’ it is determined
by the maximisation of a social welfare function reﬂecting inequality aversion,
the speciﬁcation, also involving wm/¯ w, takes the form:








+ α3t + α4t
2 (44)
As mentioned above, the median voter model and the social welfare max-
imising models are observationally equivalent in the case where ε =1 .I f
17a time series of observations is available for a single country, and if it can
be assumed that inequality aversion underlying policy remains constant over
time, then a simple ﬁrst approach would be to estimate (44) for alternative
assumed values of ε: the value giving the maximum R2 may then be taken as
the implicit inequality aversion used in policy making. Of course, it could not
be taken as an ‘estimate’ of the actual inequality aversion of policy-makers,
which can be substantially diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to ft h ev a l u ei m p l i c i ti na c t u a l
policy decisions (which are obviously not made following consideration of a
fully speciﬁed optimisation problem). Alternatively, it would be useful if a
relationship between α1 and α2 could be established, for example by impos-
i n ga na s s u m e dr a t eo fc h a n g ei nR when, say, wm/¯ w =1 .B u t f r o m t h e
above model, this change depends on the tax rate and is thus not constant.
Nevertheless, a check on the minimum implied slope of the relationship be-
tween R and wm/¯ w provides a valuable check, because it would be expected
to be a small negative number.10 However, in practice is is very diﬃcult to
construct such a time series dataset, and it is likely that the variation in
wm/¯ w would not be suﬃciently wide for estimation purposes.







1 − t(1 − β
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(1 − α − β)
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so that, given extraneous estimates of α and β, and values of the relevant
variables for a single period (or averages over a short period) it would be





Such values would clearly need to be treated with great care.
10In practice an examination of (43) using cross-sectional data providing suﬃcient vari-
ation in wage rate inequality and tax rates needs to rely on the application of this type of
criterion to judge the credibility of the results.
187 Conclusions
This paper has examined the optimal composition of government expendi-
ture, in terms of the ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public
goods, for a given income tax rate. A social welfare function, in terms of
indivduals’ utilities, was maximised subject to the government’s budget con-
straint, involving a loss of one degree of freedom in policy choices. An explicit
solution to this optimal tax problem was obtained in which the optimal ratio
of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function
of the ratio of the welfare-weighted mean wage rate to the arithmetic mean
wage rate, and of the tax rate.
Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated
with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure,
at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively
low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer
payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are asso-
ciated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods. A comparison of the
welfare maximising solution with the majority voting outcome was made.
It was shown that the diﬀerence involves the use of the ratio of median to
mean wages in the voting model. Using an assumption that wage rates are
lognormally distributed, a simple relationship between an approximation to
the welfare-weighted mean and the median wage was obtained, involving the
degree of constant relative inequality aversion. Numerical examples were
provided, showing the sensitivity of policy choices to a range of parameter
values.
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